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Preeminent	place	of	violent	resistance	in	Algeria’s	
modern	history	and	politics	
In	recent	years,	two	important	books	have	focused	on	the	violence	of	the	French	
conquest	and	colonization	of	Algeria,	beginning	in	1830.	Le	Cour	Grandmaison’s	
Coloniser,	Exterminer1	emphasizes	the	role	colonies	such	as	Algeria	played	in	the	
development	of	military	forms	of	violence	later	imported	to	Europe,	while	
Brower2	gives	a	fine	description	of	the	violent	means	used	by	the	French	army	to	
control	the	Algerian	desert	after	the	conquest.	In	doing	so,	both	authors	go	
beyond	the	well-known	episodes	of	Algerian	armed	resistance--notably	the	
armed	resistance	of	Amir	Abd-al-Qadir	in	the	1830s	and	'40s,	and	the	War	for	
Independence	(1954-1962)--to	re-emphasize	the	duration	and	intensity	of	
violence	in	the	resistance	against	French	colonial	occupation	of	Algeria.	However,	
such	discourse	leaves	little,	if	any,	narrative	space	for	uncovering	the	existence	
and	discussing	the	role	of	other,	nonviolent,	forms	of	struggle	developed	by	
Algerians	against	the	French	colonial	occupation.	
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In	Algeria	after	independence,	figures	such	as	Amir	Abd-al-Qadir,	Bachagha	El-
Moqrani	(leader	of	the	1871	uprising),	or	Sheikh	Bouamama	(a	leader	of	1881-1908	
insurrection)	were	celebrated	in	lieux	de	mémoire3--naming	streets	and	squares	
after	them	or	erecting	their	statutes.	The	most	ubiquitous	faces	of	the	nationalist	
struggle	in	Algeria	have	undoubtedly	been	shuhada	(martyrs)	who	gave	their	lives	
in	the	war	for	independence.	Their	constant	commemoration	occupies	a	large	
portion	of	public	space,	and	they	are	regularly	recalled	in	official	speeches	and	
ceremonies.	August	20	was	chosen	as	Martyr	Day,	marking	the	violent	uprising	in	
the	Constantine	region	in	1955.	It	was	one	of	the	main	roles	of	the	former	
Mujahidin	(veterans)	ministry	to	publish	and	broadcast	narratives	of	individual	
combatants.	Booklets,	press	articles	or	popular	films	glorified	armed	struggle,	and	
sacralized	the	martyrs’	sacrifice.	Ceramic	tiles	representing	figures	of	martyrs	
were	used	to	decorate	the	city	of	Algiers,	and	Algeria	is	in	fact	known	as	blad	
milyun	shahid,	the	million-martyr	country.4	In	1988,	a	national	monument	was	
constructed	in	commemoration	of	their	sacrifice:	the	Maqam	Shahid,	visible	from	
all	sides	of	the	bay,	has	two	statues	at	its	foot.	One	represents	the	National	
Liberation	Army	soldier	bearing	his	weapon,	while	the	other	is	an	armed	peasant-
-both	symbols	of	a	nation	united	in	arms.	Lastly,	in	their	preambles,	the	Algerian	
constitutions	of	1963,	1976,	and	1987	emphasized	the	leading	role	of	the	National	
Liberation	Front	and	the	National	Liberation	Army	(FLN-ALN)	in	winning	
independence,	presented	violent	resistance	as	the	ultimate	liberation	tool,	and	
glorified	the	memory	of	shuhada	and	the	dignity	of	mujahidin.	
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When	the	Front	de	Libération	nationale	(FLN)	came	to	power	after	the	War	for	
Independence,	their	reinterpretation	of	past	events	produced	an	official	history	of	
the	liberation	struggle	-	a	history	that	was	univocal	and	linear.5	It	was	a	linear	
narrative	because	it	claimed	that	nationalism	had	been	conveyed	through	a	single	
ideological	thread--a	political	genealogy	that	linked	FLN	with	the	Étoile	Nord-
Africaine	created	in	1926	amongst	the	Algerian	workers	in	Paris,	the	Parti	du	
peuple	algérien	(PPA)	established	in	1937,	and	the	Mouvement	pour	le	Triomphe	
des	Libertés	démocratiques	(MTLD)	set	up	in	1946.	The	FLN	was	an	ultimate	and	
quintessential	avatar	of	all	these	political	parties.	Consequently,	all	other	political	
organizations	were	considered	illegitimate,	and	their	contributions	to	a	national	
struggle	denied.	It	was	also	a	univocal	narrative	because	it	defined	“Algerianness”	
as	Arabic	in	language	and	Muslim	in	religion,	thus	symbolically--and	to	some	
extent	practically--excluding	other	languages	(French	or	Berber)	and	religions	
(Christian	or	Jewish).	Furthermore,	the	collective	subsumed	the	individual	to	fit	
FLN	populist	ideology:	as	there	had	been	“but	one	hero,	the	people,”	individual	
glorification	was	only	accepted	for	martyrs.6	As	a	result,	until	recent	years,	
personal	accounts	in	the	form	of	autobiographies,	biographies,	and	memoirs	were	
a	genre	absent	from	modern	Algerian	history.		
	
The	constraints	set	by	official	history	not	only	influenced	public	
commemorations	and	vernacular	narratives,	but	also	affected	the	writing	of	
academic	history	in	Algeria	and	also	in	France,	where	much	of	the	Algerian	
history	was	being	written.	Benjamin	Stora’s	biography	of	Messali	Hadj,	leader	of	
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the	MNA	(Mouvement	national	Algerian,	a	rival	organization	to	the	FLN)	in	
19867,	was	undoubtedly	a	subversive	endeavor	both	in	form	and	topic,	bringing	to	
the	foreground	a	figure	rejected	from	official	history,	and	showing	how,	at	every	
turn,	Messali	was	faced	with	decisions	concerning	tactical	choices	that	were	more	
complex	and	nuanced	than	a	simplistic	divide	between	legal	action	versus	armed	
struggle.	After	the	censorship	loosened	in	2000s,	a	few	autobiographical	
narratives	were	published.8	These	sources	are	fundamental	for	describing	and	
accounting	for	certain	forms	of	collective	resistance,	in	particular	more	informal	
types	of	defiance.	For	example,	they	reveal	ties	between	the	workings	of	cultural	
associations,	trade	unions	and	political	parties.	Childhood	stories	emphasize	the	
importance	of	the	scouting	movement	as	a	means	of	resistance.	Autobiographies	
uncover	how	people	confronted	colonization	on	a	more	intimate,	individual	and	
family	level	rather	than	the	more	organized	level	of	political	parties.		
	
Classically	in	post-colonial	states,	victorious	armed	movements	created	national	
narratives	that	often	help	them	stay	in	power	and	shape	the	nation.	In	Algeria,	
after	1962,	official	history	presented	revolutionary	violent	methods	and	guerrilla	
warfare	as	the	only	possible	means	by	which	independence	could	have	been	
achieved.	This	narrative	was	institutionalized	in	Algerian	academia	during	the	
1970s	while	state	monopoly	over	book	publication,	including	history	textbooks,	
left	no	outlet	for	competing	narratives.		
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As	a	result,	the	use	of	nonviolent	forms	of	resistance	such	as	formation	and	work	
of	cultural	associations	or	political	nonviolent	organizing	in	particular	during	the	
“decade	of	political	parties”	after	the	Second	World	War9,	appeared	as	nothing	
more	than	“dilatoriness	and	pointless	discussion”,	in	the	words	of	the	historian	
and	former	activist	Mohammed	Harbi10,	and	they	have	been	accepted	as	such	
even	by	those	who	actively	participated	and	led	them.	Such	attitudes	led	to	a	loss	
of	collective	memory	of	the	nonviolent	forms	of	action	while,	in	reality,	cultural	
associations,	unions,	as	well	as	sufi	and	family	networks--largely	tacitly	and	
nonviolently—had	resisted,	and	later	openly	challenged	colonization.		
	
French	colonial	occupation	of	Algeria	
The	French	colonial	project	in	Algeria	involved	a	complex	subjugation	strategy,	
and	its	severity	and	intensity	conditioned	how	the	indigenous	people	could	resist	
it.	The	territorial	conquest	in	1830	was	followed	by	military	occupation	that	lasted	
until	1871.	As	a	consequence	of	the	imposition	of	a	new	colonial	regime	after	the	
defeat	of	Abd-al-Qadir,	the	power	of	the	warrior	aristocratic	class--the	jawad--
was	gradually	reduced,	and	the	tribal	system	that	had	organized	society	in	
Algeria	disintegrated.	Just	as	significant	as	the	defeat	of	military	insurrections	of	
Mohamed	El-Moqrani	(1871-72)	and	Sheikh	Bouamama	(1881-1908)	was	the	de-
culturalization	of	this	Bedouin	society.11	The	cultural	consequences	were	drastic.	
In	the	first	20	years	of	the	occupation,	the	number	of	indigenous	schools	was	cut	
by	half.12	In	1914,	only	one	indigenous	child	out	of	20	had	access	to	French	
education13,	and	by	the	end	of	the	colonial	period,	French	universities	were	
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producing	only	a	few	dozen	graduates	from	the	colonized	population	annually,	
most	of	whom	where	illiterate	in	Arabic.	Classical	Arabic	language	was	in	fact	one	
of	the	first	victims	of	colonization:	under	colonial	rule,	there	was	no	equivalent	to	
the	universities	of	the	Qarawiyyin	in	Fes	(Morocco)	or	the	Zaytuna	in	Tunis.	The	
establishment	of	schools	with	Arabic	as	a	language	of	instruction	was	subject	to	
various	types	of	bureaucratic	hurdles	and	permissions	that,	de	facto,	made	it	
impossible.		
	
Algeria	was	also	a	settler	colony	to	which	many	French	and	other	Europeans	
migrated.	In	1860,	200	000	Europeans	were	living	in	Algeria	and	owned	340	000	
hectares	of	land	(rising	to	more	than	1.2	million	hectares	by	1881).14	Forms	of	
dispossession	ranged	from	direct	land	purchase	(of	dubious	legality)	to	
expropriation,	and	land-confiscation	as	a	form	of	collective	punishment.	
Uprooting	large	portions	of	the	population	had	long-term	consequences	for	
pastoral	and	farming	families	who	were	driven	into	poverty	and	forced	to	
migrate:15	In	a	country	where	over	90	percent	of	the	population	had	been	rural,	
the	disruption	was	considerable.	This	traumatic	and	forceful	transformation	
branded	the	memory	of	the	conquest	for	the	decades	to	come.		
	
Lastly,	after	1848,	Algeria	was	legally	no	longer	a	colony	but	an	extension	of	the	
French	Republic,	yet	a	region	of	France	where	the	local	population	was	at	first	
excluded	from	French	citizenship	and	never	gained	full	citizenship	rights.		Until	
1945,	the	indigenous	population	elected	no	representatives	and	the	code	de	
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l’indigénat	(indigenous	law)	established	in	1874	created	a	number	of	offences	
applicable	solely	to	Algerians,	limiting	their	constitutional	freedoms.16		
	
However,	even	at	the	peak	of	French	colonial	domination,	the	colonized	society	
never	ceased	to	resist.	Between	the	nineteenth	century	episodic	outbursts	of	
armed	resistance	and	the	armed	revolution	that	began	in	1954,	nonviolent	forms	
of	enduring	and	resisting	conquest	and	colonization	were	developed.	During	the	
long	era	of	colonization,	they	evolved	from	an	organic	reaction	to	protect	the	
collective	fabric	of	Algerian	indigenous	society,	to	the	demand	for	full	citizenship	
and	sovereignty	of	the	people.		
	
Resistance	to	the	conquest	of	the	land	and	against	the	
imposition	of	a	new	authority	
Mass	emigration	as	a	form	of	collective	resistance	
One	of	the	forms	of	nonviolent	resistance	that	most	troubled	the	French	
authorities	in	the	first	years	of	the	conquest	was	Algerians’	emigration.	Early	
emigrations	were	forced	by	the	invasion	and	subsequent	pacification,	as	well	as	
by	the	repression	that	followed	every	uprising.	However,	as	early	as	1830,	
emigration	also	appears	to	be	a	form	of	resistance	to	the	imposition	of	non-
Muslim	authority,	according	to	the	Muslim	practice	of	hijra.	According	to	
demographer	Kamel	Kateb17,	Algerians	were	leaving	the	country	mainly	for	
Morocco,	Tunisia,	Syria,	Palestine	or	Egypt,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	for	other	
Muslim	countries.		
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The	French	found	these	waves	of	emigrations	troublesome,	and	eventually	took	
measures	against	them.	Although	emigration	benefited	European	settlers	by	
freeing	land,	it	also	posed	problems:	mass	exodus	had	a	clear	political	meaning	
that	embarrassed	the	authorities.	Further	costs	for	the	French	were	that	the	
departure	of	tribes	contributed	to	the	breakdown	of	public	order	in	Algeria	and	
the	increase	of	banditry,	while	the	emerging	French	economy	in	Algeria	was	
hindered	by	the	loss	of	labor	force.		
	
Generally,	these	migrations	were	visible	actions	pursued	by	large	groups	of	
families	from	the	same	city	or	region,	convinced	of	the	necessity	to	leave	in	
reaction	to	the	new	colonial	conditions.	These	people	were	fleeing	the	rule	of	a	
non-Muslim	government,	confiscation	of	their	lands,	and	later	military	
conscription.	Emigration,	they	hoped,	would	preserve	their	cultural	and	social	
identities	endangered	by	the	French	conquest.	While	the	early	emigration	waves	
are	impossible	to	measure,	the	later	ones	show	the	breadth	of	the	phenomenon.	
The	last	mass	emigration	was	the	departure	for	Syria	of	508	families	of	the	city	of	
Tlemcen	in	1910-11	in	reaction	to	the	threat	of	conscription	to	the	French	army.		
	
The	scale	of	the	emigration	movement	reveals	the	profoundness	of	social	
disruption	in	and	after	1830.	“1830	was	an	end	of	the	world”,	wrote	James	
McDougall,	referring	to	the	domestic	consequences	of	the	conquest.18	Seeing	
mass	emigration	as	defiance	of	the	colonial	power,	the	French	authorities	carried	
9		
out	surveys	to	analyze	them	and	tried	to	block	them	by	refusing	the	necessary	
permissions.	That,	however,	did	not	stop	many	families	from	leaving	the	country	
illegally.	The	authorities	also	threatened	tribes	with	confiscation	of	their	lands,	
thus	foreclosing	the	possibility	of	their	return	or	of	benefiting	from	what	wealth	
they	possessed.19	The	issue	was	also	diplomatically	sensitive,	as	it	created	tensions	
with	the	countries	of	destination.	In	some	cases	the	migrant	families	refused	
registration	at	the	French	consulate	and	rapidly	blended	with	the	local	
population.	In	other	cases	however,	local	authorities	sought	French	assistance	in	
managing	these	large	numbers	of	newly-arrived	migrants.	Furthermore,	as	Kateb	
points	out,	this	nonviolent	action	threatened	French-imposed	security	in	Algeria	
as	hostile	Algerian	populations	began	concentrating	on	the	Moroccan	and	
Tunisian	borders	at	a	time	when	these	countries	were	not	yet	French	
protectorates.		
	
Rejection	and	Boycotts	
In	the	first	decades	of	colonization,	notably	under	the	rule	of	Napoleon	III	and	
with	the	“civilizing	mission”	gaining	popularity	among	many	officers	of	the	
Bureaux	arabes20	(colonial	offices	for	collecting	and	analyzing	information	on	
colonized	population,	and	responsible	for	designing	a	policy	toward	the	
indigenous	population),	the	mission	of	“enlightening”	and	re-educating	
indigenous	population	became	central	to	several	projects.	Daniel	Rivet	describes	
efforts	to	settle	down	nomadic	populations,	or	to	create	new	villages	designed	by	
French	architects	on	a	western	model.21	Despite	equipping	them	with	hammams	
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(bath	houses)	and	mosques,	the	failure	of	these	settlements	was	resounding	as,	
for	example,	women	rejected	them	and	refused	to	stay	in	these	new	places.	The	
authorities	also	faced	local	refusal	to	adopt	medical	services	provided	by	the	
army.	While	infirmaries	were	installed	among	certain	tribes,	it	appears	that	the	
people	never	subscribed	to	the	preventive	forms	of	medicine	that	were	on	offer,	
limiting	their	attendance	to	times	of	crisis	and	the	need	for	curative	medicine.		
	
Western	education	also	encountered	quiet	noncooperation.	The	rare	Franco-
Arab	schools	created	among	tribes	met	no	success.	One	Arab	Bureau	head	
explained,	“the	indigenous	people	consider	that	sending	their	children	to	school	
is	the	most	burdensome	duty	that	we	impose	upon	them.”22	The	imperial	college	
in	Algiers	stagnated	while	two	schools,	opened	for	indigenous	women	in	Algiers	
and	Bône,	failed	entirely	for	lack	of	pupils.	More	broadly,	Yvonne	Turin	identifies	
what	she	calls	a	period	of	refus	scolaire	or	boycott	of	French	schools	by	notable	
Algerian	families	(their	intended	target)	that	lasted	at	least	until	the	1880s.23	
These	families	considered	unacceptable	to	entrust	their	children’s	education	to	
non-Muslim	and	non-Arabic	speaking	schools.	In	other	words,	the	colonialists’	
attempts	to	seize	and	transform	the	minds	and	bodies	of	the	colonized	
population	were	faced	with	a	persistent	form	of	mute	resistance	that	the	French	
found	extremely	difficult	to	overcome.	For	those	who	remained	in	the	country,	
this	refusal	seemed	to	be	the	way	to	oppose,	resist	and	endure	in	the	face	of	
foreign	domination	brought	by	military	force	and	economic	imperialism.	The	
French	painter-writer	Eugène	Fromentin	commented:		
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Unable	to	exterminate	us,	they	[the	local	population]	suffer	our	presence;	
unable	to	flee,	they	avoid	us.	Their	principle,	their	motto,	their	method	is	to	
remain	quiet,	to	disappear	as	much	as	possible	and	to	be	forgotten.	They	
demand	little:	they	demand	integrity	and	peace	in	their	last	refuge.24	
	
Withdrawal	
For	those	who	remained	under	colonial	rule,	another	means	of	resistance	was	to	
define	and	protect	a	private	space	against	the	disruptions	and	interference	of	the	
colonial	system	around	them.	Consequently,	the	areas	of	resistance	became	
family,	home,	and	the	spiritual	and	religious	life.	These	intimate	spheres	were	
places	of	refuge	and	perseverance	of	cultural	practices,	and	identities	from	before	
the	conquest.	Anthropologist	Jacques	Berque	considered	religion	to	have	become	
a	“bastion	of	withdrawal”	for	the	colonized	population	of	Algeria	to	preserve	their	
identity.25	For	those	who	refused	to	leave	to	a	foreign	land,	it	provided	the	means	
for	an	internal	hijra	-	a	personal	and	deeply	emotional	and	psychological	
migration	and	withdrawal	to	the	“inner	domain”--as	a	form	of	resistance.26	
	
In	this	process,	seemingly	non-political	and	personal	practices	underwent	
transformations	that	politicized	them.	In	particular,	women’s	practices--their	
behavior,	clothing	and	role	in	the	family--acquired	a	political	importance,	and	
became	symbols	of	cultural	resistance	to	European	domination,	and	a	reflection	
of	a	growing	national	identity.	Their	fathers,	husbands	and	brothers	now	viewed	
Algerian	women	as	the	repository	of	cultural	identity,	who	needed	special	
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protection	as	they	became	a	repository	for	the	preservation	of	family	and	societal	
values	in	the	face	of	gradual	disintegration	of	local	culture	and	encroaching	
“Frenchification.”	Because	European	men	were	particularly	interested	in	
“oriental”	women--notably	to	paint	them,	later	to	photograph	them--Algerian	
women	were	ever	more	under	special	protection	of	men,	and	more	confined	to	
their	homes,	reinforcing	tacit	resistance	against	foreign	cultural	expansion	but,	at	
the	same	time,	increasing	the	gender	gap	and	exacerbating	masculinity.27	In	the	
same	fashion,	the	veil	(at	that	time	in	the	form	of	the	haïk,	a	long	veil	covering	
the	whole	body)	acquired	a	new	importance,	as	a	means	to	protect	women--and	
with	them	the	core	of	collective	identity--from	the	gaze	of	Europeans.	The	entire	
body	became	a	means	of	resisting	foreign	disruption	and	intrusion.		
	
Resistance	of	Sufi	Brotherhoods	
In	this	context,	sufi	brotherhoods	came	to	play	an	important	role	in	resisting	
French	presence	in	Algeria.	In	several	cases	they	led	or	supported	armed	
insurrections	against	the	French	and	provided	refuge	to	leaders	of	armed	
insurrections	after	their	defeat.	However,	according	to	Julia-Clancy	Smith,	there	
were	also	episodes	during	which	colonial	tension	involving	sufi	brotherhoods	
peaked,	without	transforming	into	violent	resistance.28		
	
At	the	turn	of	the	nineteenth	century,	the	colonized	population	was	mobilized	to	
protect	a	sufi	center,	the	Rahmaniyya	zawiya,	at	the	oasis	al-Hamil,	near	Bu	
Sa‘ada,	south	of	Algiers,	against	French	attempts	to	control	it.	The	French	had	
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leveled	various	earlier	sufi	centers,	but	this	complex,	built	in	1863,	grew	to	be	the	
most	popular	in	Algeria,	boasting	a	prestigious	school	and	library	and	surrounded	
by	farms.	Led	by	Sheikh	Sidi	Muhammad	of	the	Rahmaniyya	sufi	order,	it	
attracted	those	who	wanted	to	benefit	from	his	saintly	baraka	(blessing),	either	
by	following	the	rich	curriculum	provided	by	the	school,	or	even	by	choosing	to	
be	buried	on	the	zawiya	grounds.	People	thus	expressed	their	desire	to	rest	in	a	
land	insulated	from	foreign	interference.	French	authorities	distrusted	this	
powerful	influence	outside	their	control.	They	also	coveted	the	zawiya’s	wealth:	
its	cash	and	properties	of	land	and	flocks.	Sidi	Muhammad	had	avoided	
confronting	the	French	directly	but	resisted	complying	with	colonial	rule	by	
insisting	on	his	religious	duty	to	provide	refuge	to	fellow-Muslims,	including	
defeated	military	rebels	and	other	fugitives	from	the	French.	Between	Sidi	
Muhammad	and	the	French,	there	was	“an	unstated,	yet	mutually	binding,	pact,	
whose	implicit	terms	granted	political	order	in	return	for	religious	autonomy.”29		
However,	in	1897	the	French	saw	their	opportunity	to	take	control	of	the	zawiya	
when	Sidi	Muhammad	died	with	his	succession	unclear.	
	
In	the	conflict	over	succession,	the	French	supported	the	claims	of	Sidi	
Muhammad’s	nephew,	against	those	of	his	daughter,	Lalla	Zaynab.	As	a	woman,	
they	argued,	she	would	be	weak,	incapable	of	administrating	the	zawiya	
effectively,	and	become	a	pliable	tool	in	the	hand	of	the	anti-French	elements.	
Lalla	Zaynab,	however,	for	all	her	apparent	frailty,	successfully	resisted	the	
French	until	her	death	(in	1904).	First	she	protected	the	zawiya	against	her	rival	
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by	denying	him	access.	She	later	demanded	French	protection,	using	the	
inconsistencies	in	the	French	policies,	and	calculating	that	they	would	not	dare	
to	evict	her	by	force,	as	was	indeed	the	case.	The	French	found	her	an	
embarrassing	character	to	deal	with:	her	choices	of	celibacy	and	virginity	
increased	her	spiritual	influence	and	social	power.	As	Clancy-Smith	points	out,	
the	story	reveals	“the	absence	of	colonial	mechanism	for	containing	small-scale,	
nonviolent	rebellions,	particularly	led	by	Muslim	women,”30	and	emphasizes	that	
this	was	also	true	in	Tunisia,	particularly	where	zawiyas	were	headed	by	women.		
	
Resistance	against	exclusionary	state	policies:	the	
struggle	for	citizenship	
The	Jeunes	Algériens	(Young	Algerians)	movement	
The	shift	from	religious	movements	or	opposition	limited	to	the	private	sphere	to	
a	more	open	and	public	involvement	in	various	cultural	associations	and	political	
organizations	coincided	with	the	emergence	of	the	Jeunes	Algériens	movement,	
early	in	the	twentieth	century.	Its	leaders	and	members	were	a	small	elite	of	
Francophones,	with	a	core	of	perhaps	1,000	members.31	They	were	a	product	of	
French	schooling	who	demanded	that	the	republican	principles	taught	at	school-
-embodied	in	full	French	citizenship	rights--be	applied	to	the	colonized	
population	of	Algeria.	Their	claims	to	citizenship,	however,	were	always	met	with	
policies	setting	limitations	on	full	citizenship.	One	condition	for	acquiring	full	
citizenship	rights	was	unacceptable	to	many	who	otherwise	would	have	qualified:	
the	requirement	to	relinquish	Muslim	legal	status,	and	thus	become	subject	to	
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the	French	civil	code	for	personal	matters	such	as	marriage	or	inheritance.	This	
condition	many	Algerians	considered	equivalent	to	apostasy,	a	further	blow	to	
what	was	left	of	their	collective	identity.	
	
In	their	struggle	for	citizenship	rights	the	Jeunes	Algériens	developed	new	
institutions	and	practices:	setting	up	and	printing	periodicals	and	newspapers,	
opening	cultural	and	fraternal	clubs,	organizing	political	rallies,	and	local	
electoral	campaigns	that	mobilized	the	elite.32	More	broadly,	associations--
particularly	cultural	associations--became	the	main	tool	to	involve	the	population	
in	forming	and	consolidating	their	collective	practices	separate	from	the	French.	
Literature	associations,	music,	geography,	sports	associations	multiplied	in	the	
1920s.33	Jeunes	Algériens	saw	such	activities	as	directly	linked	to	the	vision	of	an	
aware	citizen	who	was	educated,	and	publicly	involved	in	leading	civic	and	
political	initiatives.	This	bourgeois	vision	of	the	citizen	was	heavily	influenced	by	
the	French	republican	ideal.	Jeunes	Algériens	newspapers	published	ideas	for	
political	reforms	that	were	also	promoted	in	manifestos,	petitions	and	
delegations	sent	to	France.	They	demanded	a	representative	parliament,	fairer	tax	
system,	and	equal	and	competitive	access	to	the	positions	in	administration.	
However,	the	French	administration	in	Algeria,	and	French	Algerian	newspapers	
reviled	them	constantly	for	their	“anti-French	attitudes.”	Although	not	successful	
in	gaining	full	citizenship	rights,	the	movement's	association	activities	laid	
important	foundations	for	the	emergence	of	other	political	organizations,	
including	Fédération	des	élus	indigènes	(The	Federation	of	Elected	Indigenous	
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Representatives)	that	in	turn	helped	politicize	some	parts	of	the	Algerian	
population	and	was	one	of	the	roots	of	Algerian	nationalism.		
	
Islamic	reformism	and	the	culture	of	nationalism	
In	the	1930,	another	movement	emerged	that	shared	the	concerns	of	Jeunes	
Algériens	for	cultural	development--	the	Ulama	movement,	headed	by	Sheikh	
Abdelhamid	Benbadis.	Within	two	decades,	this	movement	became	a	nationwide	
network	of	schools	and	associations	promoting	a	reformed	version	of	Islam	and	
knowledge	of	the	Arabic	language.34	In	doing	so,	it	took	from	and	continued	the	
tradition	of	the	movements	born	in	Egypt	of	the	Nahda	(Arab	renaissance)	and	
Islah	(Islamic	reform).	The	logic	was	no	longer	that	of	finding	shelter	in	collective	
identity,	but	of	reinvigorating	it	by	going	back	to	its	supposed	roots:	a	Salafi	form	
of	Islam	(following	the	model	of	the	forefathers,	prophet	Muhammad	and	his	
companions),	cleansed	of	sufi	influences--notably	the	cult	of	saints	in	the	
zawiyas--considered	to	be	deviations	from	the	purportedly	“original”	Islam;	and	
the	propagation	and	diffusion	of	Arabic--which	the	colonial	forces	had	fought	
against--through	a	modernized	pedagogy.		
	
Despite	refusing	to	enter	the	institutionalized	political	scene	(for	instance,	as	a	
political	party),	the	Ulama	motto	shows	clear	political	implications:	“Islam	is	my	
religion,	Algeria	my	fatherland	and	Arabic	my	language.”	The	movement	
developed	what	James	McDougall	calls	a	culture	of	nationalism	that	relied	on	a	
historical	discourse	of	what	it	meant	to	be	Algerian.35	In	promoting	a	nationalist	
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thought,	the	Ulama	schools	valued	greatly	teachings	of	history	of	the	Arab	
conquest	in	North	Africa.	Ulama	also	encouraged	importation	from	Egypt	of	
history	books	promoting	Arabo-Muslim	history	and	values.	This	national	
discourse	was	sustained	by	new	practices	that	helped	a	newly	invented	
“Algerianness”	become	embodied	in	music,	theater	performances,	or	religious	
celebrations.	For	example,	cultural	circles	organized	dramatizations	where	school	
children	played	great	figures	of	the	Muslim	or	North	African	past.	Ulama	believed	
that	weakened	spirituality	allowed	for	foreign	domination	and	continued	
colonization.	Consequently,	they	aimed	to	cleanse	religious	practices	of	those	
traditional	aspects	viewed	as	unorthodox	or	magical	and	therefore	as	spiritually	
weakening	the	Algerian	population	in	its	struggle	against	foreign	domination.		
	
Politicization	of	cultural	forms	of	resistance	
The	decade	after	the	Second	World	War	was	characterized	by	the	integration	of	
previously	highlighted	nonviolent	collective	practices	(such	as	cultural	
organizing,	meetings,	festivities)	and	their	further	development	within	the	
frameworks	of	new	political	parties.36		
	
Political	opening--although	still	limited	as	Algerians	had	fewer	rights	than	
European	colons--allowed	colonized	population	to	participate	in	the	legislative	
elections,	and	encouraged	political	forces	to	organize	into	mass	parties.	This	
resulted	in	the	establishment	in	1946	of	the	Union	Démocratique	du	Manifeste	
algérien	(UDMA)	led	by	Ferhat	Abbas	and	the	Mouvement	pour	le	Triomphe	des	
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Libertés	démocratiques	(MTLD)	led	by	Messali	Hadj.	They	joined	the	Algerian	
Communist	Party	(PCA)	in	representing	the	colonized	population.		
	
The	political	parties	did	not	limit	themselves	to	conventional	work	of	fighting	
elections	and	sending	representatives	to	parliament.	They	became	promoters	of	a	
broader	form	of	cultural	resistance	not	limited	to	the	personal	domain,	as	in	
earlier	times.	This	cultural	resistance	became	genuinely	collective	and	creative	
under	the	auspices	of	the	parties	that	took	up	the	struggle	for	the	creation	of	a	
collective	self,	for	the	formation	of	an	Algerian	people	(although	they	had	
different	definitions	of	what	this	people	should	be).	Political	parties	thus	became	
entrepreneurs	of	national	culture.	For	instance,	while	the	UDMA	and	the	PCA	
considered	that	the	Europeans	living	in	Algeria	would	naturally	be	part	of	the	
independent	country,	the	PPA	and	MTLD	considered	that	“Algerianness”	meant	
being	Arab	and	Muslim.	Algerian	theater	or	musical	troupes	found	their	ways	
into	political	rallies,	thus	popularizing	nationalist	discourse.	Various	professional	
groups	were	often	invited	to	political	meetings	to	give	plays,	while	children’s	
associations	(notably	scouts,	or	students	of	the	Ulama	schools),	closely	linked	to	
one	or	the	other	party,	were	asked	to	play	sketches	with	an	explicitly	nationalist,	
religious	or	moral	message.	The	police	clearly	understood	the	impact	that	such	
events	could	have,	and	surveyed	them	closely,	noting	names	of	actors,	themes	
and	vocabulary	used.	A	surveillance	report	written	by	the	Oran	police	in	
September	1951	described	one	political	meeting:		
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A	four-act	play,	entitled	“Union”	was	interpreted	in	Arabic	by	the	students	
of	the	Falah	school.	The	plays	showed	four	brothers,	feuding	with	each	
other,	whose	father,	Atlas,	was	arrested	and	put	in	jail	by	an	ambitious	
sultan.		
Facing	this	situation,	the	children	reconcile	with	each	other,	and	manage	to	
free	their	father.	The	allusion	to	the	present	is	direct:	the	four	children	are	
the	UDMA,	the	MTDL,	the	PCA	and	the	Ulama	association:	they	unite	to	
fight	off	imperialism.37		
Political	parties--especially	the	UDMA,	closely	linked	to	Ulama--gradually	helped	
set	the	foundations	for	a	new	nationalist	history.38	The	party	newspapers	were	
publishing	articles	that	contributed	to	the	writing	of	a	nationalist	history.	They	
commemorated	nationalist	figures	(such	as	Amir	Abd-al-Qadir	or	Abdelhamid	
Ben	Badis),	historic	dates	(the	Manifesto	of	the	Algeria	people	in	1943),	and	
promoted	Arab	or	Islamic	history.	Party	rallies	were	ritually	constructed	around	
various	carefully	choreographed	and	sequenced	installments,	including	
commemorations	of	past	events	(notably	the	bloody	repression	of	May	1945),	and	
celebrations	of	nationalist	figures.	Any	party	rally	included	a	short	historical	
lecture,	during	which	speakers	rejected	the	notion	that	Algeria	had	been	a	
wasteland	before	the	arrival	of	the	French;	they	debunked	colonial	scholarship	
(according	to	which,	to	give	but	one	example,	Berber	and	Arab	populations	
differed,	with	the	former	being	“closer”	to	Christianity	and	European	culture	than	
the	latter),	and	glorified	Arab	history,	proving	its	value	in	the	face	of	colonial	
domination.	Party-related	activities	also	promoted	national	rites,	customs,	and	
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symbols.	Several	versions	of	the	Algerian	flag	were	popularized,	patriotic	national	
songs	taught	in	the	Ulama	schools,	or	in	the	scout	troupes	were	sang	during	
rallies.	The	party	also	held	conferences	pertaining	to	topics	such	as	morality,	
religion,	hygiene	and	disease	prevention	during	which	the	line	between	the	
political	and	the	cultural,	social	or	religious	was	ultimately	blurred.	All	these	
nonviolent	collective	actions	were	considered	necessary	for	shaping	nationally	
conscious	citizens,	by	improving	their	education	and	knowledge	of	Algerian	
history	and	culture,	their	mores,	or	their	physical	well-being.		
	
Intensity	of	police	surveillance	and	its	repression	led	all	parties--including	those	
who	opposed	an	armed	insurrection--to	find	means	of	self-protection.	Many	
former	militants	tell	stories	of	having	had	meetings	in	the	woods,	away	from	the	
village,	to	avoid	the	police.	Archives	also	reveal	how	parties	employed	their	
younger	members	to	ensure	security	of	a	meeting	by	preventing	possible	police	
informers	from	entering:	blocking	the	door,	checking	membership	cards,	warning	
party	members	of	police	presence	to	allow	them	to	disperse.		In	the	frequent	
cases	where	the	newspapers	were	seized	by	censorship,	alternative	means	of	
distribution	was	organized.	The	MTLD	youth	organized	several	campaigns	during	
which	the	inscription	“Algérie	libre”	(free	Algeria)	was	written	on	the	walls	of	the	
cities;	leaflets	were	handed	out	rapidly	and	discreetly;	flash-rallies	were	organized	
on	market	squares	before	the	police	had	time	to	intervene.		
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Electoral	campaigns	after	1948,	when	the	French	administration	systematically	
began	to	rig	elections	on	a	large	scale,	dramatized	the	conflict.39	Nationalist	
parties,	which	never	gave	up	entirely	on	participating	in	the	elections,	constantly	
tried	to	develop	new	strategies	to	neutralize	administrative	intervention	in	the	
electoral	process.	In	Constantine	in	1951,	party	militants	were	encouraged	to	
prevent	“even	at	the	cost	of	their	lives,	the	exchange	of	ballot	boxes”40--a	
common	form	of	electoral	fraud.	Party	affiliates	were	also	trained	to	be	more	
efficient	in	the	monitoring	polling	stations,	and	their	presence	on	election	day	
was	such	a	problem	for	the	authorities	that	it	often	led	to	arrests,	or	brawls	with	
the	police.41		
	
Practices	presented	above	were	unconventional	and	involved	a	degree	of	physical	
engagement	that	went	beyond	traditional	party	politics	and	electoral	
campaigning.	In	a	colonial	context,	where	nationalist	symbolism	constituted	a	
threat	to	the	status	quo	and	where	democracy	was	a	mere	formality,	the	attempts	
to	create	national	narratives	and	define	the	meaning	of	a	nation,	to	defend	and	
expand	autonomous	political	space,	and	protect	the	legality	of	the	elections,	or	to	
guard	voters	from	police	harassment	became	intense	forms	of	nonviolent	
resistance	to	colonial	oppression.	
	
Algerian	trade	unionism	
Both	the	PCA	and	the	MTLD	had	close	ties	with	trade	unions	after	the	First	
World	War.	Most	Algerian	workers	where	affiliated	with	the	French	CGT	
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(Confédération	générale	du	travail)	that	did	not	always	heed	the	calls	of	their	
Algerian	activists	to	discuss	the	national	question	while	its	leadership	was	
reluctant	to	appoint	Algerian	nationalists	to	key	positions.	However,	according	to	
former	union	leader	Boualem	Bourouiba,	unionized	Algerian	workers--for	
example,	in	the	docks--were	not	all	Communists,	and	many	were	members	of	
other	nationalist	parties	(MTLD,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	UDMA)	after	the	Second	
World	War.42	Though	the	question	of	the	establishment	of	an	Algerian	Union	
was	raised,	it	was	not	until	1956	when	the	UGTA	(Union	général	des	travailleurs	
algériens),	linked	to	the	FLN,	was	created.			
	
Algerian	unionists	had	an	essential	role	in	organizing	solidarity	with	other	French	
occupied	territories.	For	example,	in	the	1950s	the	Algerian	dockers’	unions	called	
on	workers	to	stop	loading	weapons	to	be	shipped	to	French	forces	in	Vietnam,	
where	the	French	were	fighting	a	war	against	a	movement	for	independence.43	
These	actions	were	in	some	cases	coordinated	with	strikes	in	France	itself,	as	in	
March	1952,	when	dockers	in	both	Marseille	and	Oran	refused	to	load	weapons	
for	Vietnam.44		
	
Various	examples	show	creativity	in	the	use	of	general	strikes.	April	25,	1952,	was	
declared	a	day	of	mourning	in	solidarity	with	Tunisians,	where	thousands	of	
independence	activists	had	been	arrested	and	hundreds	killed	in	recent	months	
by	French	repression.	In	Algeria	political	parties	and	unions	organized,	
throughout	the	country,	a	general	strike	and	a	series	of	nonviolent	collective	
23		
actions	such	as	boycotts	and	protests.	The	Constantine	préfecture	noted	that	in	
the	days	prior	to	the	general	strike	“emissaries	went	around	the	Arab	quarters	of	
Constantine	and	invited	Muslim	women	to	remain	at	home	on	Friday,	in	
particular	those	who	worked	in	Europeans	families.”45	On	April	25,	collective	
actions	took	place	throughout	the	country,	with	workers	and	shopkeepers	going	
on	strike,	and	street	demonstrations	occurring	even	in	smaller	localities.	Traffic	
in	the	main	Algerian	ports	was	blocked.		
	
Despite	popular	support	for	those	actions,	they	remained	relatively	rare.	Three	
explanations	might	be	offered	for	this.	Firstly,	Algerian	trade	unionism,	as	an	
effective	force	in	the	struggle	against	colonialism,	was	weakened	because	of	the	
absence	of	a	national	union,	and	the	impossibility	of	reaching	all	segments	of	
what	was	not	yet	a	working	class.46	Secondly,	as	a	consequence,	political	parties	
were	the	main	organizers	of	nationwide	actions,	but	competition	between	the	
three	nationalist	parties	was	intense	and	blocked	strategic	cooperation--the	April	
1952	strike	was	a	short-lived	exception.	Thirdly,	the	political	parties	diverged	
dramatically	on	the	advisability	of	mass	nonviolent	protest,	an	indecision	that	
stemmed	from	the	traumatic	experience	of	the	May	1945	massacres.	At	the	day	
celebrating	the	German	surrender	in	the	Second	World	War,	nonviolent	
demonstrations	in	eastern	Algeria	had	turned	into	riots	and	anti-European	
attacks	after	police	shot	demonstrators	waving	an	Algerian	flag	in	Sétif.47	In	the	
days	and	weeks	that	followed,	both	the	French	authorities	and	armed	European	
militias	roamed	the	Constantine	region,	perpetrating	summary	executions	and	
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massacres,	while	cruisers	and	aircraft	carriers	stationed	in	the	Bougie	bay	
bombed	villages.	Thousands	were	killed	and	most	nationalist	leaders	were	
detained	for	several	months.	In	the	years	that	followed,	terrifying	narratives	of	
the	violence	against	the	colonized	population	were	circulated,	including	those	
concerning	the	burning	of	bodies	in	the	lime-kilns	of	Héliopolis.48	
	
The	trauma	of	May	1945	set	back	collective	involvement	for	years.	Combined	with	
the	authorities’	oppressive	measures	to	impede	unified	action,	and	differences	
among	nationalists	over	the	use	of	alternative	forms	of	mobilization	and	
engagement	outside	the	rules	set	by	the	colonial	administration,	Algerians	felt	
their	choice	was	either	acquiesce	by	participating	in	the	rigged	and	
discriminatory	electoral	process,	or	reject	this	legal	form	of	action	in	favor	of	
armed	struggle.49		
	
Nonviolent	actions	captured	by	the	fervor	of	violent	
struggle	
The	FLN	achieved	its	dominant	position	over	other	Algerian	political	factions	
through	the	use	of	violence	against	political	adversaries	in	what	was	in	fact	an	
“Algero-Algerian	war”,50	and	then	through	both	forceful	and	voluntary	cooptation	
of	former	political	rivals.	It	organized	several	nonviolent	actions	as	a	tool	for	
mobilization	and	preparation	for	war,	with	the	aim	of	securing	and	showing	a	
wide	popular	support.	The	first	major	initiative	was	a	permanent	strike	by	
students	that	began	in	May	1956,	without	explicit	demands,	but	expressed	
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support	for	the	FLN	and	its	goals.	While	appearing	to	be	merely	a	boycott	of	
French	universities,	the	strike	in	fact	forced	the	intellectual	elite	and	prominent	
families	to	get	involved.	It	also	politicized	swathes	of	students	available	now	for	
further,	more	extreme	actions,	and	attracted	new	recruits	for	the	National	
Liberation	Army	with	new	combatants.	The	student	permanent	strike	raised	
general	disagreements	over	the	role	students	and	intellectuals	should	be	playing	
in	the	national	struggle:	some	argued	that	the	student	boycott	of	their	education	
was	wrong	in	principle	and	endangered	the	country’s	future	intellectual	capital;	
the	counter-argument	was	that	intellectuals	should	show	their	organic	link	with	
the	population	by	their	readiness	to	engage	in	whatever	way	possible	or	
demanded	by	the	FLN.	
	
Similarly,	the	FLN	used	the	eight-day	strike	in	January	and	February	1957	to	drive	
the	population	to	take	a	public	stance	in	support	of	FLN	and	its	actions	that	
would	in	turn	helped	the	organization	present	itself	as	the	legitimate	voice	of	the	
Algerian	people.	Alongside	the	genuine	popular	support	for	the	FLN	and	the	
national	cause,	there	was	also	intensive	pressure	on	all	workers	to	quit	their	jobs,	
close	their	shops	and	stay	home.	The	strike	was	followed	in	most	large	Algerian	
cities.	The	chosen	date,	28	January	coincided	with	the	United	Nations	General	
Assembly	(UNGA)	session	adopting	a	resolution	in	favor	of	Algerian	
independence.51	The	strike	marked	the	beginning	of	the	so-called	“Battle	of	
Algiers”,	also	known	as	the	Great	Repression	of	Algiers52,	and	was	in	fact	used	to	
support	an	ongoing	armed	struggle	and	transform	the	entire	population	of	
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Algiers	into	combatants	in	the	war	for	independence--a	task	that	became	easier	
as	a	result	of	the	subsequent	disproportionate	use	of	force	and	violence	by	French	
paratroopers	that	backfired	and	fuelled	insurgency	all	over	the	country.	By	1957,	
all	resistance	actions	served	the	goals	of	advancing	armed	struggle.		Nonviolent	
strategies	rather	than	offering	an	alternative	to	violence	were	hijacked	by	the	
fervor	of	armed	insurrection	and	subordinated	to	a	greater	imperative	of	waging	a	
war.	
	
Conclusion	
French	colonization	in	Algeria	was	one	of	the	most	intense	colonial	encounters	of	
the	nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries.	The	severity	of	the	socio-economic	
disruption	caused	by	the	colonial	regime	and	the	harsh	conditions	of	the	French	
colonization	in	Algeria	(including	the	massacres	of	May	1945)	limited	the	range	of	
possible	forms	of	collective	activities.	The	fact	that	political	parties	or	unions	
developed	later	in	Algeria	than	they	did	in	other	North	African	countries	(Tunisia	
or	Egypt)	was	undoubtedly	linked	to	the	breakdown	of	Algerian	society	in	the	
face	of	colonization.	
	
When	armed	insurrections	failed	to	repel	military	conquest	and	occupation,	the	
population	adopted	strategies	of	persistent	endurance	and	survival.	Emigration	
and	more	muted	forms	of	resistance,	such	as	withdrawal	into	more	intimate	and	
private	domains	of	family	life,	are	difficult	for	historians	to	assess.		It	is	only	with	
the	emergence	of	the	Jeunes	Algériens	and	the	development	of	cultural	
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associations	in	the	1920s	that	this	endurance	took	on	public,	more	constructive	
and	collective	dimensions.	Collective	activities	became	a	means	of	moving	away	
from	simple	survival	to	more	proactive	initiatives	of	rebuilding	the	social	fabric	
and	reinvigorating	colonized	society,	despite	ongoing	restrictive	and	oppressive	
colonial	policies.		
	
Political	parties	succeeded	in	drawing	on	a	repertoire	of	nonviolent	actions	to	
mobilize	in	the	nationalist	cause,	but	their	lack	of	unity,	and	reluctance	to	use	
more	forceful	nonviolent	methods	such	as	general	strikes,	made	them	ineffective	
in	securing	serious	political	concessions.	This	partly	explains	the	teleological	
narrative	of	the	Algerian	history	promoted	by	FLN	after	independence,	according	
to	which	armed	struggle	was	the	only	viable	tool	to	obtain	independence.	
Consequently,	national	identity	construed	after	the	colonial	war	was	formed	on	a	
double	denial	of	plurality--a	plurality	of	political	ideologies	and	nationalist	
parties	and	their	contribution	to	the	struggle	for	independent	state;	and	a	
plurality	in	understandings	of	what	“Algerianness”	meant	and	embodied.	This	
kind	of	discourse	had	denied	in	its	entirety	the	value,	role,	impact	and	legacy	of	
unarmed	forms	of	collective	struggle.		
	
It	was	only	after	the	1988	demonstrations,	when	civic	associations	and	political	
parties	became	legal	again,	that	the	intensity	of	past	experiences	of	nonviolent	
organizing	and	actions	appeared	reactivated:	within	a	few	days,	dozen	of	political	
parties	were	founded.	Nonviolent	practices	and	activist	networks	often	with	their	
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philosophical,	institutional,	and	practical	roots	in	the	pre-independence	period	
were	suddenly	mobilized	again,	thus	revealing	that	the	decades	of	nationalist	
mythology	had	failed	to	erase	them	entirely.		
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